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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

L. P. BENTLEY and CLARICE E.
BENTLEY,
Plaintiff,
Respondent,

Case No. 18241

vs.
LOWELL E. POTTER,
Defendant,
Appellant ..

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

NATURE OF THE CASE

This action was brought in the Third District Court for
Salt

Lake

County

for

breach

of

a

mining

lease.

The

plaintiff-respondent sought payment for damages to the leased
premises and judgment for monies -due under the lease.

The

plaintiff-respondent also sought judgment for money due on the
sale of a truck.

The defendant-appellant later counterclaimed

for misrepresentation and for conversion of a trailer.
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT

The
Wilkinson

matter was

without

a

defendant-appellant's

heard

by the

jury.
Counter

The

Honorable Horner F.

Court

Claim

for

denied

the

misrepresentation,

ordered the plaintiff-respondents to return the trailer and
granted

the

plaintiff-respondents

judgment

in

the

sum

of

$19,375.46 for the various damages claimed.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

The plaintiff-respondents

seek modification of the

judgment to correct errors in the determination of the date of
termination of the lease and also in the method of determining
damages.

In all other respects the Plaintiff-respondents seek

affirmance of the Court's judgment and findings.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

part~es

On May 1, 1978 these
lease.

entered into a mining

The lease required in its relevant parts for the lessee

(defendant-appellant)

to

make

payment

of

minimum

annual

royalties, to complete the annual assessment work as required by

2
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federal law, and to properly care for and operate the leased
premises during mining and to

return the premises

condition upon completion of mining.

in good

(Plaintiff's Exhibit "l").

The defendant-appellant entered into possession of the
leased premises, cleared overburden from a portion of the ore
(T-20,

T-172)

and thereafter failed to do any further work,

(T-18)

failed to make payment of the minimum royalty,

(T-16) and

failed to complete the annual assessment work (T-18, T-19).

In

addition, the overburden that was removed was left on top of the
ore and in the access roadway without further removal to a site
proper for the placement of the overburden so as to permit future
mining (T-24).
damaging to the

Such placement of the overburden was improper and
leased premises (T-100-104, T-109).

The plaintiff-respondents made numerous demands that
the assessment work be done, that the minimum royalty be paid and
that the overburden be removed (T-26).

On August 10, 1979, the

plaintiff-respondent caused a letter from his attorney to be
delivered to the defendant-appellant demanding correction of the
placement of the overburden and completion of assessment work.
(T-23

Exhibit

"2").

On

December

4,

1979,

after

the

defendant-appellant had failed to respond to the demand in any
way

(T-23) ,

the plaintiff-respondents commenced suit seeking

damages for breach of covenants under the lease and for money due
on the sale of a dump truck.

(See Pleadings P. 3 and T-32) .

3
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On March 5, 1980, after the defendant-appellant had
still

failed

to cure the breach of the

lease

(T-33) ,

the

plaintiff-respondent caused a Notice of Termination of the lease
to be delivered to the defendant-appellant and to his attorney.
(Plaintiff's Exhibit 13).
The court in its Findings of Fact and Memorandum
Decision found that there was an enforceable lease supported by
consideration and that

there was

a

breach thereof by the

defendant-appellant in failing to make minimum royalty payments,
in failing to do annual assessment work and in failing to take
proper care of the leased premises.

The court found that the

lease required 60 days notice prior to termination and that the
notice dated August 10, 1979, was such notice as required.

The

court further found that the commencement of suit on December 4,
1978, was in effect a termination of the lease and not the letter
of termination dated March 5, 1980.

The court further found that

the defendant had personally assumed the
balance

of

$1000.00

due

for

a

dump

liability for the

truck

sold

by

plaintiff-respondents to defendant-appellant's corporation.
In determining damages the court ruled that the lease
was terminated on December 4, 1979.
defendant

owed

$2500. 00

for

minimum

The court found that the
royalty

payments

from

December 1, 1978 to November 30, 1979 and a prorata amount of
$27. 44

for December 1,

1979

to December 4,

1979;

that

the

defendant owed assessment work in the amount of $5000.00 for May

4
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1, 1978 to April 30, 1979 which work was accomplished but that
the defendant-appellant owed $848.02, as a prorated amount for
the period May 1, 1979 to December 4, 1979.

The court found that

the damages attributable to the defendant-appellant for improper
placement of the overburden was $15,000.00, although the total
damages to the leased premises were $25,000.00.
The

plaintiff-respondent

does

not

contest

the

$15,000.00 figure but does contest the prorationing of assessment
work liability and the prorationing of the minimum royalty.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
SEPARATE ACTIONS MAY BE BROUGHT FOR SEPARATE AND
DISTINCT BREACHES OF A DIVISIBLE CONTRACT AND AT THE
TIME OF THE BREACH WITHOUT TERMINATION OF THE CONTRACT.
-AThe law is well established under generally accepted
principles of contract law that
"Where a parties' performance is
several or is divisible into
separate and distinct acts, so that
the contract is subject to separate
and distinct breaches, recovery for
the breach of one separate and
independent provision will not
preclude a subsequent suit for a
distinct breach of a different
condition" 1 Am Jur 2d, Actions
Sections 135, and 137 at p. 652.

5
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Also,

if certain covenants are susceptible of more than one

breach, then there may be as many causes of action as there are
breaches •

See 1 Arn Jur 2d Actions Sections 138 and 140.

see Corbin on Contracts Section 956.

Also

The rule has been applied

to a covenant to make repairs in a lease, See Beach v. Crain, 2
N.Y. 86 (1845); and also has been held to provide for successive
actions for breach of a covenant to pay royalties.

See Fifield

v. Biesanz, 209 N.W. 259, 167 Minn. 399 (1926).
The corollary to these rules is that "A cause of action
in contract accrues at the time of the breach or failure to do
the thing agreed".
Corbin

on

See 1 Arn Jur 2d Actions Section 89, also

Contracts,

Section

948.

Thus,

for

example,

a

contractor may sue for installments accruing under the terms of
an entire building contract as they become due and need not wait
until the building is complete, Milske v. Steiner Mantel Co., 103
Md 235, 63 A. 471

(1906); or a party may sue under a covenant to

repair before termination of the lease, Corbett v. Derman Shoe
Company, 155 N.E. 2d 423 (1959).
In Corbett there were two covenants:
one to redeliver in good condition.

One to repair and

The suit for failure to

repair was commenced prior to termination of the lease which
happened three years later.

The court held that there was a

separate cause of action for breach of the covenant to repair and
that the covenant of redelivery did not preclude such an action
prior to termination.

6
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Thus

on

the

facts

before

this

court

the

plaintiff-respondent had the right to bring a cause of action for
the failure to complete the assessment work for 1978, and another
for failure to do the assessment work for 1979, and still another
for failure to operate in a workmanlike manner.

All of the above

are separate an divisible covenants of the lease which are also
susceptible of continuing or multiple breaches.
This case is different from those where the party seeks
prospective damages or an action based on antincipatory breach
requiring a repudiation of the contract.

Accordingly, although

there is authority for the proposition that suit upon a covenant
to return the premises in a condition similar to that at time of
entry cannot be brought until the end of the term, such authority
is not applicable to this case as it was originally brought.

The

lease was not repudiated as was the plaintiff-respondents' right.
Under

the

facts

before

the

court

the

plaintiff-respondent sought repayment for assessment work done,
and correction of certain activities that were believed to be in
violation of the covenant to proceed in a workmanlike manner.
Thus, the commencement of the law suit was not a termination of
the

lease.

The

plaintiff-respondent

defendant-appellant would cure
operate the leased premises c
continued and the

the default

hoped

and continue

It was not until

plaintiff-respondent chose

reasons to terminate the lease on March 5,

the
to

the breach

for

additional

1980,

that the

7
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obligations

of

the

defendant-appellant

ceased.

It

wa.s

subsequently to this notice that the complaint was amended to
seek damages for minimum royalties due and for failure to return
the premises in proper condition.
Thus,

it was

(See Pleadings P. 34).

improper for the Court to rule

that

December 4, 1979, the date of commencement of suit, was the date
of termination of the lease rather than March 5, 1980, the date
of Notice of Termination.

POINT II
THE COURT'S DETERMINATION
OF DAMAGES WAS IMPROPERLY PRORATED
FOR PARTIAL YEARS
-AThe lease provided at Section III B. Minimum Royalty as
follows:
The lessee, beginning on the 1st day of
December, 1978, and on the 1st day of
December of each and every year
thereafter, so long as this lease shall
remain in force and effect shall pay to
the lessors an annual minimum royalty as
follows; to-wit:
$2,500.00 for each of
the twelve month periods ending November
30, 1979 and November 30, 1980 and $5000
for each successive twelve (12) month
period thereafter.
(Emphasis added)

8
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The plaintiff having proved that the lease was valid is
entitled to enforcement according to its terms.

The payments

were due December 1, 1978 and December 1, 1979 for $2500.00 each
year following.
year.

The court awarded only $27.44 for the second

Plaintiff-respondent makes two alternative exceptions to

this findinge
1)

The payments should not be prorated. By the clear

unequivical language of the lease the payment was due December 1,
1979.

The defendant-appellant testified at trial that this was

his understanding of the lease terms (T-190) •

The payment would

be offset by actual production if any but in no other way.

The

plaintiff had no obligation to prorate the amount when the breach
and

termination

were

totally

the

result

of

the

defendant-appellant's non-performance.
2)

The date of termination was not the date of suit

but rather March 5, 1980 and thus if the payment should be
prorated it should be prorated from December 1, 1979 to March 5,
1980.

See the discussion of date of termination under Point I.

-B-

The assessment work was also prorated from May 1, 1979
to December 4, 1979.
The lease provides at Section VII "The lessee agrees to
do and perform all of the annual assessment work required by law

9
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in order to maintain each and all of the unpatented mining
claims".

(Emphasis added).

The amount required to be done was

found by the court to be $100. 00 per year per claim for 14
claims.

This was in accordance with the subsequent portion of

Section VII which states
comply with

the

"Such a.nnual assessment work shall

provisions

of all

Statutes,

including the

provision that not less than $100.00 per year be expended for the
benefit of each claim."

The year referred to by the lease was

the federal mining law year not the lease year.

This amount

should not have been prorated.
Under federal law, assessment work must be completed
before August 31st of the year.

The failure to complete the work

as of December 4, 1979, was failure under the federal law for the
entire year, since the plaintiffs had to have the work done by
that time and recorded by December 31, 1979 to preserve his right
to the claims.

The assessment work was not properly prorated for

a partial year from May 1 to December 4 since the lease year has
no relation to the federal law.
In addition the plaintiff-respondents again assert that
the lease was terminated as of March 5, 1980 rather than December

4, 1979 and that if prorationing was proper the date should have
been until the later date.

10
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-cNo evidence was introduced at trial that the parties
intention or interpretation of these paragraphs for determination
of damages was consistant with the interpretation imposed by the
Court.

The lease language is clear and unambiguous on these

points.

It was improper for the court to impose upon the parties

its own terms for prorationing.
according

to

the

clear

language

Damages should be determined
of

the

lease

without

modification.

POINT III
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT MADE NO WARRANTIES AS TO TITLE
AND DEFENDANT-APPELLANT WAS NOT DAMAGED
BY ANY FAILURE OF TITLE.

The

defendant-appellant's

basic

excuse

for

non-performance at trial was an alleged "failure of title".

The

defendant-appellant was never definite as to when this concern
about title arose but at one point testified that it was about
the 90 days preceding the amendment of the lawsuit in the fall of
1980.

(T-180)

Failure of title was not asserted in response to the
letter of August 10, 1979 or as a defense in the Answer filed
January 17, 1980.

It was not until December 19, 1980 when the
11
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Answer was first amended that it was first asserted that only two
of the fourteen claims were not properly filed with the B.L.M.
On December 24,

1980, the Answer was amended again and it was

then asserted that the claims were improperly filed as placer
rather that lode claims.
It was shown at trial that the defendant-appellant
himself had hired an individual to file the lode claims over the
claims of the plaintiff-respondent in October of 1980 one year
after the commencement of the law suit.

(T-204)

-A-

The owner of an unpatented claim is entitled to mine,
remove and sell all valuable mineral deposits within his claim
boundaries

that

are

not

adjacent claim owners.

subject

to

extralateral

rights

of

The claimant is also entitled to such

surface rights as are necessary for mining operations.

Fee title

remains with the Federal government until patent issues.

The

right of a claimant is an exclusive possessory interest in the
claim which can be sold, leased, mortgaged or inherited without
infringing

the

paramount

title

of

the

Untied

States.

See

generally, J. Maley Handbook of Mineral Law, Second Edition 1979
p. 203.

12
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The defendant-appellant admitted he was never excluded
from the claims and that his right to possession was never
challenged.

(T-196-197)

A claim is a right exclusive to other occupation for
mining of the same mineral.

The lease recognized these factors

by providing under Article XII Title to Leased Premises.
If the Lessors; interest in the mineral
rights in the Leased Premises, or in the other
necessary rights required to enable the Lessee to
operate and develop the Leased Premises in the
manner contemplated herein, is less than whole,
and the title failure affects the mining
operations then being conducted, the production
royalties
payable
hereunder
shall
be
proportionately reduced in accordance with the
proportion that the number of acres affected by
such title failure bears to the total number of
acres included within such claim affected.
The Lessee shall not be deemed to be in
default in payment of any production royalties
hereunder while the title of the Lessors' is
challenged by any third person or while any third
person appears of record to have any right, title
or interest adverse to the Lessors, if such
production royal ties are paid to a bank or
reputable escrow agent; provided, however, that if
such adverse interest affects only a part of the
Leased Premises or a part of the interest of the
Lessors therein, the foregoing provision shall
apply only if the Lessee shall pay to the Lessors
such part of the total royalty as is applicable to
the land or interest not affected by such adverse
claim.
If the Lessors hereafter acquire any
additional interest or title in the Leased
Premises, then this Lease shall cover such
additional after acquired interest.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the minimum
royalty payable hereunder shall not be reduced
because of any failure of the Lessors' title,
unless the Lessee is prevented from mining all of
the Leased Premises by order of a court of
competent jurisdiction.
In that event, the
minimum royalty shall be suspended until such
order is vacated.
The minimum royalty for such

13
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year shall be prorated.

(emphasis added)

And again the lease provides at Article I Grant of
Lease
The Lessors hereby grant, lease and let
exclusively unto the Lessee, all of their right in
and to those certain unpatented placer mining
claims (hereinafter [sic] referred to as the
"Leased Premises" described in Exhibit "A".
Thus the lessee is expected to mine the land and if
there is a defect that affects the ability to mine, then there
are to be adjustments, not termination of the lease.

But there

were no interferences with the defendant's possession.

-BMining

claims

valuable mineral.

are

located upon

a

discovery of a

Two types of mineral claims are possible: lode

and placer. A lode claim is locatable upon discovery of a vein or
lode "of quartz or other rock in place bearing gold,

silver,

cinnabar, lead, tin, copper or other valuable deposits (30_ U.S.C.
Section 23).

A placer claim may be located for "all forms of

deposit, excepting veins of quartz or other rock in place"

u.s.c.

Section 35).

(30

Uncommon varieties of building stone may be

located with placer-type claims pursuant to the Act of August 4,
1892

(30

u.s.c.

Section 161) on lands that are chiefly valuable

for building stone.

See Maley supra at 203.

Defendant-appellant asserts the claims should be lode
claims although the Lease clearly indicates it is a Lease of

14
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placer

claims.

(See

Defendant-appellant
"chickenfeed"

Exhibits

asserts

to

the

lease

material

Exhibit
is

"A") .

usable

as

(T-203), and therefore locatable as a lode.

This

is akin to a lessee claiming that a lead-zinc ore that is usable
as a building stone should be filed on as a placer claim rather
than as a lode claim and thereby defeat the rights of a lessor to
the mineral royalties.

The rule is that the primary economic use

controls the method of location.
economic

use

and

value

was

See Maley, Supra.

established

at

The primary

trial

by

plaintiff-respondent's expert as an uncommon variety building
stone.
In a recent case,
IBLA 247

U~ted

States v. Mamie Vaughn,

(July 24, 1981) the court held Dolomitic marble

is similar to the

arago~.te

56

(which

claims of plaintiff-respondent) had a

distinct and special value as building stone and was present in
marketable quantities and therefore was an uncommon variety and
locatable by a placer claim.

-cSection 314 of the Federal Land Policy Management Act
of 1976

(43 U.S.C. Section 170) required that a claimant of an

unpatented claim file a notice of claim with the B.L.M. office by
October 22, 1979.
Federal Law (30 U.S.C. Section 28) requires assessment
work of not less than $100.00 per claim be performed each year

15
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beginning September 1st of each year and be recorded on or before
December 31 of each year.
Prior

to

issuance

of patent

the Bureau

of

Land

Management may challenge the validity of a mining claim for a
variety of reasons.

Proceedings are begun by service of a

complaint and administrative proceeding are held within the
Department of Interior.
The certified record on exhibit with the court in this
case gives the following evidence:
1.

(Defendant's Exhibit "14").

Annual Assessment work was filed for 1980 on

September

2,

19 8 0

by

Lloyd

Bentley

(plaintiff-respondent) .
2.

On September 4, 1979 an evidence of assessment

work was filed for the 1979 year ending August 30
by Lloyd Bentley (plaintiff-respondent) .
3.

A document dated July 24, 1980 was sent to the

plaintiff-respondent
defendant-appellant)

(care

of

the

as Notice of Deficiency for

filing the Amended Notice of Location instead of
the original instrument of recordation for claims
Sno-King No.

1, White Could No.

1, White Queen

Nos. 1 and 2, White Dragon Nos. 1 and 2.
4.

On July 30, 1979 plaintiff-respondent filed

the original Notices of Location for White Queen
No. 1 and No. 2.
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5.

On August 21,

1980 a copy of the original

Notice of Location was filed for Sno-King No.1,
White Cloud No. 1, White Dragon Nos. 1 and 2.
6.

Subsequently all July 24 Deficiency Notices

have been marked "satisfied" by the B.L.M. office
as indicated on the official copies before the
court.
Thus, the official B.L.M. record shows no deficiency,
and no pendency of hearing by B.L.M. to challenge the claims.
The only challenges are the lode claim filed at the direction of
defendant-appellant himself for the same mineral one year after
the law suit commenced.

As stated previously only uncommon

varieties chiefly valuable as building stone may be claimed and
only by a placer claim.
In summary, the defendant-appellant's claim of title
defect is without any basis in law or fact and is asserted
without prior notice

as

a

spurious

attempt

to

deter

the

plaintiff-respondent's action.
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POINT IV
THE COURTS FINDINGS OF FACT AS
DETERMINED FROM TESTIMONY OF THE
WITNESSES SHOULD NOT BE SET ASIDE
SINCE THEY ARE FULLY SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE.

The Findings by the trier of fact are entitled to a
presumption

of validity and upon

appeal

all

evidence

and

inferences that can be reasonably drawn therefrom should be
viewed in the light most favorable to support the Findings and
Judgment of the trial court.
(Utah 1975).

Catler v. Bower, 543 P. 2d 1349

Briefly considered, the factual questions raised by

the defendant-appellant in his brief are responded to as follows:
1.
together

with

Lack
the

defendant-appellant

of

consideration.

actual

taking

demonstrates

of
that

The mutual
possession
there

was

covenants
by

the

adequate

consideration to support the lease agreement. The issue of title
has been separately treated under Point IV and shows no lack of
title or consideration.
2.
The

trial

Damages resulting from placement of the overburden.

court

determined

that

the

actual

damages

were

$25,000.00 but were to be reduced to off-set any contribution or
failure on the part of the plaintiff-respondent to mitigate the
damages.

such determination involving a balancing of a variety
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of factors are particularly well suited to the judgment of the
trier of fact who has before him all the witnesses and evidence.
The court's findings are clearly supported by evidence
including

testimony

of

plaintiff-respondents'

the

plaintiff-respondents

and

the

expert that the placement was improper,

was not consented to and was damaging because of its location
over the ore and in the path of the road.
3.

Acknowledgment of liability for the dump truck.

The defendant continually admitted at his deposition and at trial
(T-213,214) that he was personally responsible for the debt owing
for the truck.
The admission although verbal is not affected by the
Statute of Frauds Section 25-5-4 U.C.A. since this was a finding
of the court not an attempt to enforce a verbal promise.

If a

party seeks enforcement of an agreement that is within the
Stature of Fraud,
admissible.

But,

without objection,

testimony of the oral agreement

is

not

if a party admits to an agreement in Court
then the Stature of Frauds does not bar

enforcement of the agreement.

W.W. & Co. B. Gardner, Inc. v.

Pappas, 24 U. 2d 264, 470 P. 2d 252

(1970).

Once admitted the

facts were before the court to support the judgment.
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SUMMARY

In summary, the judgment should be upheld to the extent
that there was a finding of breach of the lease and damages to
the plaintiff-respondent resulting therefrom.
damages

should be recomputed.

The amount of the

The remainder of the Court's

judgment is supported by the facts and the law and should not be
reversed.
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